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C O I ' ~ O ~ ~ ~ ~ O ~ S - D I R E C T O R  LIABILITY-THE STANDARD OF IRECTOR 
LIABILITY FOR A CORPORATE VIOLATION OF SECTION 1982- Tillman 
v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association, 517 F.2d 1141 (4th 
Cir. 1975). 
Plaintiff Harry C. Press, a black homeowner residing within 
the geographical preference areal served by the defendant 
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association, Inc. (Association) was 
denied membership in the Association solely on the basis of his 
race. Plaintiffs Murray and Rosalind Tillman, members of the 
Association, were denied permission to bring a black guest to the 
Association swimming pool solely because of the guest's race. 
Both denials were made pursuant to an admittedly discrimina- 
tory policy adopted by the Association's directors and approved 
by a majority of the members. In October 1969, plaintiffs sued the 
Association and its directors for compensatory damages and de- 
claratory and injunctive relief under the Civil Rights Acts of 
1866, 1870, and 1964.2 Plaintiffs claimed that valuable property 
rights available to white residents in the area served by the Asso- 
ciation were not available to black residents of the same area.3 
The district court accepted the defendants' argument that it was 
a "private club" within the meaning of section 201(e) of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964,' and therefore outside the scope of section 
1982.5 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.R The Su- 
preme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the Associa- 
tion was not a private club and that its discriminatory policies 
were within the proscriptions of section 1982.7 On remand, the 
1. The Association's bylaws provide that membership shall be open to bona fide 
residents (whether home owners or not) of the area within a three-quarter mile radius of 
the Association's pool. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U S .  431, 433 
(1973). 
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, & 2000a et seq. (1970). 
3. Under the Association bylaws, a resident within the preference area received three 
advantages: 1) he could apply for membership without the recommendation of a current 
member, 2) he received preference in applying for a membership vacancy, 3) he could pass 
to a successor-buyer a first option to acquire his (the member-seller's) membership. The 
plaintiffs argued that these advantages gave white residents of the preference area valua- 
ble property rights which were not available to black residents solely because of their race 
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) which reads: 
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State 
and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, 
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property. 
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970). 
5. The district court's opinion was unreported. 
6. 451 F.2d 1211 (4th Cir. 1971)' reu'd, 410 U.S. 431 (1973). 
7. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 440 (1973). The Su- 
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district court assessed compensatory damages, costs, and 
attorneys' fees against the Association, but absolved the directors 
of personal l i a b i l i t ~ . ~  Since the directors had obtained two inde- 
pendent opinions of counsel, the court found that they had exer- 
cised due diligence in attempting to comply with the law.g Seek- 
ing to hold the directors personally liable for the damages and 
costs and for an additional award of attorneys' fees, the plaintiffs 
appealed again. The Fourth Circuit held the directors jointly lia- 
ble for the additional attorneys' fees on grounds that ignorance 
of the law, although engendered by the advice of counsel, was no 
defense to an action based on section 1982.'" 
A. Corporate Director Liability 
The corporate director is in the unenviable position of being 
exposed to allegations of liability from many sources, including 
stockholders, corporate creditors, persons outside the corpora- 
tion, and the corporation itself." Basically, however, director lia- 
bility is divisible into two major categories. First, a director may 
be directly liable to the corporation, or derivatively liable to the 
stockholders as the "owners" of the corporation, for a breach of 
his fiduciary duty.12 The director's liability for breach of this fidu- 
preme Court remanded the case to the district court to develop the necessary facts by 
which to evaluate the claims of the parties "free of the misconception that Wheaton- 
Haven is exempt from 1981, 1982, and 2000a." Id. 
8. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 367 F. Supp. 860 (D. Md. 1973). 
9. Id. a t  865-66. 
10. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 517 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1975). 
11. Feuer, Liabilities of Directors and Officers, 5 N.Y.L.F. 127, 134 (1959) 
[hereinafter cited as Feuer]; H. FRIEDMAN & H. SCHLAGMAN, CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 
GUIDE 4 13.01 (1967) [hereinafter cited as FRIEDMAN]. "NO custom or practice can make 
a directorship a mere position of honor void of responsibility, or cause a name to become 
a substitute for care and attention." Feuer 134 (quoting Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth 
Trust Co., 223 N.Y. 103, 106, 119 N.E. 237, 238 (1918); accord, Litwin v. Allen, 25 
N .Y .S .2d 667, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1940)). 
12. For example, the following acts would be a breach of the director's fiduciary duty: 
1) competing with the corporation; 2) taking advantage of opportunities belonging to 
the corporation; 3) profiting from inside information; 4) profiting improperly from the sale 
of corporate stock; 5) making improper loans to directors or officers. FRIEDMAN 4 12.01. 
See also M. FEUER, PERSONAL LIABILITIES OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 28 (2d ed. 
1974) [hereinafter cited as PERSONAL LIABILITIES]; H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 235 (2d 
ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as HENN]; W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND 
D I R E ~ O R S  $ 4  1.03, 1.05 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as KNEPPER]; Isreals, A New Look 
a t  Corporate Directorship, 24 Bus. LAW. 727, 732 (1969). 
States are becoming aware of the desirability of imposing fiduciary standards on 
corporate directors by statute. PERSONAL LIABILITIES 30. South Dakota has a representative 
statute which imposes liability on directors for: 1)  making improper dividend 
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ciary duty is usually defined by a "reasonable man" standard: 
the director must exercise the degree of care an ordinarily prudent 
man would exercise in managing his own affairs? In some situa- 
tions, the "reasonable man" standard has been expanded by the 
"business judgment rule." Under this rule, directors will not, in 
areas of managerial discretion, be liable for errors in judgment 
which were made in good faith, with due diligence, and for the 
benefit of the corporation.14 Directors are also generally absolved 
of liability for reliance on the advice of experts, such as accoun- 
tants and attorneys, even though the advice may be errone~us. '~ 
Director liability in the second category arises from dealings 
with, or actions against, third persons.I6 This liability usually is 
-- -- - -- 
distributions; 2) improperly acquiring corporate stock; 3) making loans to corporate 
directors; or 4) commencing business before obtaining minimum capital. S.D. COMPILED 
LAWS ANN. §§  47-5-15 to -21 (1967). 
13. Comment, Trends in Corporate Director Liability, 17 S.D.L. REV. 468, 470-71 
(1972). This standard, however, varies according to the particular facts and circumstances 
of the situation. The factors which should be considered are listed in the leading case of 
Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1940): 
It has been said that a director is required to conduct the business of the corpo- 
ration with the same degree of fidelity and care as an ordinarily prudent man 
would exercise in the management of his own affairs of like magnitude and 
importance. General rules, however, are not altogether helpful. In the last analy- 
sis, whether or not a director has discharged his duty, whether or not he has been 
negligent, depends upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case, the 
kind of corporation involved, its size and financial resources, the magnitude of 
the transaction, and the immediacy of the problem presented. A director is 
called upon "to bestow the care and skill" which the situation demands. 
Id. a t  678 (citation omitted). 
In some jurisdictions, liability for errors in judgment is imposed only for gross negli- 
gence. See, e.g., Holland v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 151 Colo. 69, 75, 376 P.2d 
162, 165-66 (1962); Sellers v. Head, 261 Ala. 212, 216, 73 So. 2d 747, 750 (1954); Allied 
Freightways, Inc. v. Cholfin, 235 Mass. 630, 634, 91 N.E.2d 765,768 (1950). For a discus- 
sion of the scope of this standard see Dyson, The Director's Liability for Negligence, 40 
IND. L.J. 341, 372-76 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Dyson], and PERSONAL LIABILITIES 29- 
30. 
14. FRIEDMAN 8 11.03[3]; KNEPPER 8 1.05; PERSONAL LIABILITIES 32-33. But see Dyson 
367-71. The language most often cited comes from Pollitz v. Wabash R.R., 207 N.Y. 113, 
124, 100 N.E. 721, 724 (1912), where the New York Court of Appeals said: 
Questions of policy of management, expediency of contracts or action, adequacy 
of consideration, lawful appropriation of corporate funds to advance corporate 
interests are left solely to their [the directors'] honest and unselfish decision, 
for their powers therein are without limitation and free from restraint, and the 
exercise of them for the common and general interests of the corporation may 
not be questioned, although the results show what they did was unwise or 
inexpedient. 
15. Diamond v. Davis, 62 N.Y.S.2d 181, 191 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Epstein v. Schenck, 35 
N.Y.S.2d 969, 980-81 (Sup. Ct. 1939); PERSONAL LIABILITIES 96-99; KNEPPER 8 1.09. 
16. See generally 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 
1134 (rev. ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as FLETCHER]; FRIEDMAN 8 13.03. 
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asserted in one of three situations: 1) when the director attempts 
to bind the corporation to ultra vires acts, 2) when the director 
assumes personal liability for a corporate obligation, and 3) when 
the director commits a tort in the scope and course of his employ- 
ment.17 The present case focuses on tortious conduct. 
A corporate director is personally liable for his own torts, 
even though the corporation may also be liable.18 The director is 
likewise personally liable for torts of the corporation which he 
inspires, authorizes, directs, or in which he actively participates 
or acquiesces.lg Director liability for tortious acts of the corpora- 
tion, however, has generally been restricted to c b e s  involving 
physical injury, rather than pecuniary harm, to third persons.2n 
B. Section 1982 
The statutory provision under which the present case arose, 
42 U.S.C. 8 1982, is intended to protect all citizens from racially- 
motivated deprivations of property rights.21 After a century of 
applying this statute solely to state action, the United States 
Supreme Court, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. ,22 expanded its 
scope by ruling that a private refusal to sell property to a black 
because of race was p r ~ h i b i t e d . ~ ~  The Court justified this expan- 
17. FRIEDMAN § 13.03, a t  303. 
Liability is also imposed by some federal statutes, including securities legislation, 
e.g., Securities Act of 1933 $ 8  5,11,15 U.S.C. §§ 77f, 77k; Escott v. BarChris Const. Corp., 
283 F. Supp. 643, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); antitrust and trade statutes, e.g., Sherman Anti- 
trust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890); United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405,407 (1962); Forte, 
Liabilities of Corporate Officers for Violations of Fiduciary Duties Concerning the Anti- 
trust Laws, 40 IND. L.J. 313 (1965); Rooks, Personal Liabilities of Officers and Directors 
for Antitrust Violations and Securities Transactions, 51 ILL. B.J. 626 (1963); and the 
Internal Revenue Code, e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, $ 5  6671(b), 6672; United States v. 
Graham, 309 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962). 
18. FLETCHER § 1135; HENN 5 218. 
19. Tedrow v. Deskin, 265 Md. 546, 550, 290 A.2d 799, 802 (1972). Oft-cited language 
is found in Lobato v. Pay Less Drug Stores, Inc., 261 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1958): 
Specific direction or sanction of, or active participation or cooperation in, a 
positively wrongful act of commission or omission which operates to the injury 
or prejudice of the complaining party is necessary to generate individual liability 
in damages of an officer or agent of a corporation for the tort of the corporation. 
20. Macey v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 507 S.W.2d 722, 725 (Tex. 1974); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY, Appendix, Reporter's notes § 357 (1958). But see Lobato v. Pay Less 
Drug Stores, Inc. ,261 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1958); Tedrow v. Deskin, 265 Md. 546,290 A.2d 
799 (1972). 
21. See generally 1975 B.Y.U.L. REV. 141. 
22. 392 U S .  409 (1968). 
23. The Supreme Court has never considered the actual limitations on the scope of 
section 1982 when a truly private club has been involved. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 
Inc., 396 U.S. 229,236 (1969) and Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 
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sion by stressing the importance of maintaining property rights 
free of interference from any source, governmental or private.24 
In the instant ca~e,~?he directors raised their exercise of due 
diligence as their primary defense against imposition of liability 
for violating section 1982.2"efore adopting the discriminatory 
policies, the directors had obtained the opinions of two attorneys 
who independently agreed that the Association's policies would 
not be Moreover, these opinions of counsel were initially 
sustained by both the district court and the Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals. On remand, the district court concluded that reliance 
on the opinions, although ultimately held erroneous, was justi- 
fied: 
If the director does not know, and if in the exercise of due dili- 
gence could not have known that his action was wrongful or 
illegal, he cannot be held liable for the torts of the corpora- 
tion. . . . 
[Tlhe defendant directors did not know nor in the exercise of 
due diligence could not have known that the adoption of racially 
restrictive policies was illegal.28 
The majority on the Fourth Circuit panel rejected the defen- 
dants' contentions. The court reasoned that a violation of section 
1982 constitutes an intentional tort and that due diligence, under 
general tort law, is a defense only in actions for negligen~e.~' 
Relying on Aeroglide Corp. v. Zeh,30 the court asserted that if a 
director voluntarily and intentionally causes the corporation to 
431, 438 (1973), involved associations claiming private club status; the Supreme Court, 
however, rejected those claims. The same thing happened in a section 1981 case, Daniel 
v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969). Nevertheless, in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U S .  163 
(1972), the Supreme Court held that a private club was exempt from the restrictions of 
section 1983. Since the courts have never treated sections 1981 and 1982 differently from 
section 1983, the logical conclusion is that truly private clubs are also exempt from the 
restrictions of sections 1981 and 1982. 
24. 392 U S .  a t  423-24. 
25. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 517 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1975). 
26. 517 F.2d at  1143. The defendants adopted the reasoning of the district court 
opinion, 367 F. Supp. 860 (D. Md. 1973), in toto, and added the argument that the issue 
of director liability was moot, since the satisfaction of a judgment against the corporation 
released the directors who were the joint tort-feasors, citing RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS 
4 95 (1942). Brief for Appellees a t  9-11. 
27. 517 F.2d a t  1148 (Boreman, J. ,  dissenting). 
28. 367 F. Supp. a t  865 (citations omitted). 
29. 517 F.2d at  1144. 
30. 301 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1962). 
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act, he can be held personally liable? The majority justified the 
imposition of liability on two grounds: 1) the plaintiffs should not 
be denied the fruits of their victory in the Supreme Court, and 
2) anything short of the imposition of liability would allow corpo- 
rate officials to violate the restrictions of section 1982 with per- 
sonal impunity.J2 
Senior Circuit Judge Boreman dissented, contending that 
fault, as evidenced by a "positively wrongful" act, must be pres- 
ent in every tort, whether negligent or intentional, before liability 
could be imposed. Based on the facts of the instant case, the 
directors' actions could not be considered "positively wrongful."J:% 
The major issue in the present case is whether the exercise 
of due diligence should be a defense in a personal action against 
directors for corporate violations of section 1982 of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866. This case note will examine the court's ration- 
ale for rejecting the due diligence defense, discuss the justifica- 
tions for an alternative standard of liability for corporate direc- 
tors, and explore some of the implications of the present case for 
director liability in areas beyond the civil rights context. 
A. The Fourth Circuit's Rationale for 
Rejecting the Due Diligence Defense 
1. An intentional tort 
In the introductory paragraphs of its analysis, the Fourth 
Circuit categorized an action under section 1982 as an intentional 
tort, citing Curtis v. L ~ e t h e r . ~ ~  This premise, with the subsequent 
application of general tort principles, became the primary justifi- 
cation for the court's decision. Although this type of action may 
be analogous to several forms of common law tort actions,Vhere 
is very little precedent for treating a section 1982 suit as the 
equivalent of an intentional tort action. In the absence of a defini- 
tive pronouncement by the Supreme Court, the validity of such 
a categorization is at least debatable.Vf the majority erred in 
31. 517 F.2d at 1144. 
32. Id. at 1145. 
33. Id. at 1150. On a motion for rehearing en banc, which was denied, Judges Russell, 
Field, and Widener joined in Judge Boreman's dissent. Id. at 1154. 
34. 415 US. 189 (1974). 
35. Id. at 194; Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1117 (7th Cir. 1972). 
36. See generally Nahmod, Section 1983 and the Background of Tort Liability, 50 
IND. L.J. 5 (1974). 
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classifying this action as an intentional tort, the court loses its 
major justification for disallowing the due diligence defense and 
imposing liability on the directors. 
Even if, however, the majority correctly presumed that a 
violation of section 1982 is a statutory intentional tort, the una- 
vailability of a due dilegence defense cannot be automatically 
assumed. The plaintiffs sought to impose liability on the directors 
for a tort of the corporation, a situation dissimilar from the major- 
ity of common law tort actions. This difference arguably may or 
should preclude the blanket adoption and application of all gen- 
eral tort principles. In other words, even if a section 1982 action 
is properly classified as an intentional tort, the due diligence 
defense may be an appropriate avenue for avoiding liability. The 
justifications for this position will be discussed in section 111, B, 
1 below. 
2. The fruits of victory 
The circuit court's second justification for imposing liability 
on the Association's directors was to assure to the plaintiffs the 
fruits of their victory in the Supreme Since the court did 
not elaborate, one can only speculate as to what the court meant. 
The court was probably concerned that the money judgment 
awarded in the district court would be jeopardized unless per- 
sonal liability was imposed on the directors. 
The circuit court's decision in the present case, however, 
failed to materially affect the plaintiffs' chances for recovery. In 
a judgment designed to compensate the plaintiffs for their out- 
of-pocket costs, embarrassment, and humiliation, the district 
court awarded $5,356 in compensatory damages, $2,658.12 in 
court costs, and $200 in attorneys' fees, while specifically denying 
an award of punitive damages.3n The burden of this award was 
placed solely on the Asso~iat ion,~~ but the corporation was at  all 
times able and willing to pay all damages, even if a judgment of 
joint liability were entered."'Given these facts, the plaintiffs 
would not have been deprived of any "fruits" if the court had 
refused to impose personal liability. 
37. 517 F.2d at 1145. 
38. 367 F. Supp. at 864-65; Brief for Appellees at 2. 
39. 367 F. Supp. at 866. 
40. Brief for Appellees at 7. 
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3. Deterrence of future violations 
Finally, the court expressed a concern that the application 
of section 1982 would be severely restricted if liability were not 
imposed on the directors because the statute could then be vio- 
lated with imp~ni ty .~ '  Thus, in an effort to deter future viola- 
tions, the court subjected the directors to personal liability. The 
court failed, however, to persuasively demonstrate how its exces- 
sively harsh standard, discussed in greater detail below, will deter 
future violations of the statute more effectively than a less bur- 
densome standard. 
B. A Reasonable Standard of Director Liability 
1 .  The requirement of fault 
Assuming that a violation of section 1982 does constitute an 
intentional tort, one is confronted with the threshold considera- 
tion raised by Judge Boreman in dissent: 
Some element of fault or culpability is present in every tort. 
Even where the law imposes traditional absolute liability culpa- 
bility is still a requisite element.42 
In circumventing this argument, the majority relied upon 
Aeroglide Corp. v.  Zeh" for the proposition that if the director 
voluntarily and intentionally caused the corporation to act, that 
alone is sufficient to impose personal liability; there is no need 
to additionally establish the director's knowledge of wrongful- 
ness? In Aeroglide, a creditor-manufacturer sued a corporation 
and its directors personally for conversion of a secured asset. The 
Second Circuit held: 
That there was no direct evidence in the record that the direc- 
tors were aware of Aeroglide's security interests is not determi- 
native. The tort of conversion requires no intent or fault. The 
determinative question then is whether these directors person- 
ally participated in the conversion. . . . 45 
The majority failed to recognize, however, that Aeroglide 
represents a solitary aberration. In all other cases in which direc- 
41. The court specifically said: "The claim that a corporate official may violate 1981 
and 1982 with impunity because he exercised due diligence . . . is designed to severly 
restrict the application of these statutes." 517 F.2d a t  1145. 
42. 517 F.2d a t  1150 (citation omitted). 
43. 301 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1962). 
44. 517 F.2d at  1144. 
45. 301 F.2d at  422. 
328 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1976: 
tors have been held liable for corporate torts, the directors were 
not merely unwitting participants in tortious corporate action; 
they invariably knew that the action was illegal. For example, in 
Patrons State Bank & Trust Co. v. S h a p i r ~ , ~ ~  the president of a 
bank was sued for conversion. The court imposed liability upon 
finding that the president knew that his act was illegal. 
Shapiro as president wrongfully reassigned the proceeds from 
one assigned contract to another bank . . . . Shapiro told the 
officers of the bank that the proceeds from the assigned con- 
tracts had not yet been received by the corporation when in fact 
they had.47 
Likewise, in Solo Cup Co. v. Paper Machinery C ~ r p . , ~ ~  an action 
alleging the misappropriation of trade secrets, the district court 
held a corporate vice-president personally liable for the tort. I t  is 
apparent throughout the opinion that the court was relying on the 
fact that the vice-president not only initiated the entire scheme, 
but did so knowing of its illegal it^.^^ 
In short, the Fourth Circuit disregarded the well-established 
rule that personal liability is generally imposed only when the 
directors knew that they were acting u n l a ~ f u l l y ; ~  the court im- 
posed liability on the directors in the face of their reasonable 
efforts to ascertain the legality of their actions. Consequently, the 
directors' liability was identical to the liability that would have 
been imposed had they acted with the knowledge that their ac- 
tions were illegal. 
2. An excessively harsh standard 
Although the Fourth Circuit attempted to justify the imposi- 
tion of personal liability as a means of deterring future violations 
of section 1982, it appears that the court went further than neces- 
sary. Because of the strictness of the test, corporations not sub- 
46. 215 Kan. 856, 528 P.2d 1198 (1974). 
47. Id. a t  1204. 
48. 240 F. Supp. 126 (D. Wis. 1965). 
49. Another case involving director liability for an intentional tort is Macey v. Citi- 
zens Nat'l Bank, 507 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. 1974) (officer absolved of liability for inducing 
breach of contract because he acted in good faith). 
50. There are numerous cases where liability was imposed because the director should 
have known a dangerous condition existed or otherwise acted negligently. See, e.g., Dwyer 
v. Lanan & Snow Lumber Co., 141 Cal. App. 2d 838, 297 P.2d 490 (1956) (president knew 
high voltage wire was dangerous and yet did nothing); Allen v. Morris Bldg. Co., 360 Mich. 
214, 130 N.W.2d 491 (1900) (president willfully participated in grading land which caused 
water damage to adjacent property). 
3201 CASE NOTES 329 
ject, for one reason or another, to the prohibitions of the Civil 
Rights Acts may forego plans to adopt similar policies rather than 
subject their directors to the possiblity of personal liability. Thus, 
the decision in the instant case may chill legitimate attempts to 
limit the size and composition of purely private groups or associa- 
tions. I t  may be argued that any such attempts should be disfa- 
vored by the law in all cases. Nevertheless, since Congress has 
seen fit to exempt private associations from the restrictions of the 
Civil Rights Acts," efforts by the membership of these associa- 
tions to delineate their composition should be protected. 
A hypothetical standard for director liability that can be 
derived from the facts of the instant case further illustrates the 
excessive harshness of the Fourth Circuit's standard and the 
weakness of its "deterrent effect" argument. The directors based 
their discriminatory decision on the independent opinions of two 
attorneys, a majority of prior court decisions, and a century of 
custom.52 In short, they did all they reasonably could do to insure 
that their actions were within the bounds of the law. Their con- 
duct demonstrated, in fact, the utmost in diligence. If such con- 
duct, or "utmost diligence," were adopted as the standard for 
determining personal director liability for corporate torts, direc- 
tors would be rewarded, with protection from liability, for taking 
the most reasonably cautious measures within their power. On 
the other hand, directors would be penalized for, and thus 
arguably deterred from, exercising anything less than utmost dili- 
gence. Indeed, it appears that the deterrent effect of this utmost 
diligence standard is the maximum possible, since the standard 
punishes, and therefore deters, all avoidable wrongdoing. Ob- 
viously, the standard does not reach conduct not reasonably 
avoidable, but such conduct cannot be deterred by threat of pun- 
ishment in any event. By way of contrast, the standard applied 
in the present case does not protect directors from personal liabil- 
ity even though they take all reasonable precautions to avoid 
wrongdoing. Thus, the standard of the present case is more harsh 
than the utmost diligence standard posited above. Yet, if the 
hypothetical utmost diligence standard does indeed have a 
maximum deterrent effect, the added harshness of the Fourth 
Circuit's standard-admittedly fashioned for its deterrent effect 
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) provides that "[tlhe proyisions of this subchapter shall not 
apply to a private club or other establishment not in fact open to the public . . . ." See 
6 GA. L. REV. 813 (1972). 
52. 517 F.2d 1141, 1151-52 (Boreman, J., dissenting). 
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-cannot be justified. This additional harshness can only be 
viewed as excessive, an example of judicial overkill. 
3. Reliance on the advice of counsel 
The facts of the instant case highlight a common occurence 
in corporate operations. Because most directors have only limited 
amounts of time to devote to their duties, they are generally 
unable to be thoroughly familiar with every business, legal, and 
financial aspect of the corporation. As a result, directors fre- 
quently come to rely on the opinions, advice, and work-product 
of experts.53 Generally, these specialists are correct in their judg- 
ments, but occasionally they make an error. What should be the 
responsibility of a director when injury results from such an ex- 
pert's error in judgment? The court in the present case held that 
the director should be personally liable and that reliance on the 
advice of experts is no defense.54 Other courts have resolved this 
question differently. 
For example, in Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum & 
Transport Co. ,55 a stockholders' derivative action, certain corpo- 
rate directors were charged with fraudulent and intentional waste 
of corporate assets, profits, and business opportunities. In plead- 
ing the defense of good faith and due diligence, the defendant 
directors pointed to advice from counsel that the exploration of 
the business opportunities alleged to have been wasted would 
have been a violation of the antitrust laws. This factor influenced 
the court's decision that the directors had acted in good faith and 
in the honest exercise of their discretion and that no liability 
should be imposed.56 Also, in Gilbert u. Burn~ide,~ '  corporate 
directors were sued by stockholders who alleged that the directors 
wasted the assets of the corporation pursuant to an unlawful 
reorganization plan. In adopting the plan, the directors had relied 
on counsel's advice in good faith. The court absolved the directors 
of liability, holding that "[r]eliance upon advice of counsel is a 
good defense ."58 Likewise, in Spirt v. B e ~ h t e l , ~ ~  stockholders sued 
the corporate directors for breach of their fiduciary duty, alleging 
53. Feuer, supra note 11, at 164. 
54. 517 F.2d at 1146. 
55. 293 N.Y. 281, 56 N.E.2d 705 (1944). 
56. Id. at 294, 56 N.E.2d at 716. 
57. 13 App. Div. 2d 982, 216 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1961). 
58. Id. at 983, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 432, citing Blaustein v. Pan Am Petroleum & Transp. 
Co., 293 N.Y. 281, 56 N.E.2d 705 (1944), as authority. 
59. 232 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1956). 
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that the directors improperly handled the tax benefits of stock 
options. Counsel had advised that the directors' method of han- 
dling the options, although accruing to the benefit of the direc- 
tors, was the only proper method. The court said: 
Counsel's opinion as to the law (even though erroneous) should, 
in our opinion, protect the officers acting in reliance upon itsen 
In each of these cases, the court absolved the corporate directors 
of liability where they had in good faith relied on the advice of 
counsel 
Arguably, these cases are not relevant to the present case 
because each involves an action brought by stockholders rather 
than by persons outside the corporation. Nevertheless, these 
cases should be deemed applicable for two important reasons. 
First, one of the theories on which plaintiffs Murray and Rosalind 
Tillman asserted director liability was that the directors had im- 
properly depleted the Association's assets and each member's 
equity by subjecting the corporation to liability under section 
1982." In advancing this theory, the Tillmans assumed the posi- 
tion of "stockholders," bringing this case squarely within the rea- 
soning of Blaustein, Gilbert, and Spirt. 
Second, the issue of reliance on counsel's advice appears to 
be one of first impression in the context of director liability for 
corporate torts. Although the court could have analogized to the 
directors' duty to the corporation and its stockholders, by failing 
to do so the Fourth Circuit effectively adopted a new and stricter 
standard of personal director liability. Since the director's duty 
to the corporation is a fiduciary one, requiring the highest degree 
of competence, loyalty, and diligen~e,'~ there would appear to be 
no sound reason for requiring a director to meet a higher standard 
in his dealings with persons outside the corporation. 
60. Id. a t  247. The court cited, as an example, an illustration in RESTATEMENT OF 
TRUSTS 5 201 absolving a trustee of liability because he relied on counsel's opinion as to 
what investments were legal. Id. See PERSONAL LIBILITIES, supm note 12, a t  96-101. 
61. Indeed, i t  could be argued that directors who do not seek and rely on expert advice 
should be liable for negligence. See Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667,699 (Sup. Ct. 1940). 
Directors represent the interests of owners and are expected to comply with the legal 
requests of those owners. Often, the legality of these requests can be ascertained only by 
asking expert advisors. In the present case, the directors were trying to adopt a policy 
approved by a majority of the members. Brief for Appellees at 8-9. 
62. Brief for Appellees a t  8-9. 
63. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, a t  5 11.01; KNEPPER, supra note 12, a t  $ 1.01. 
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C. Possible Consequences of the Fourth Circuit's Decision 
The previous discussion has attempted to point out the 
weaknesses of the Fourth Circuit's position and outline some of 
the reasons a different standard should have been used. This is 
not to say, however, that the court's ultimate decision was erro- 
neous. The courts have been zealous in their use of the Civil 
Rights Acts to overcome a long history of racial discrimination, 
and it should not be forgotten that the instant case arose in a 
context of racial discrimination. Nevertheless, the possible conse- 
quences of the court's decision, if it is applied to cases not dealing 
with civil rights, are sufficiently undesirable to warrant limiting 
the decision to that context. Some of those consequences are dis- 
cussed below. 
1. Unreasons ble burden on corporate directors 
The Securities Act of 1933 is analogous to section 1982 in that 
it provides protection to purchasers of corporate securities, who 
are generally outside the corporation, from tortious or fraudulent 
acts of the corporation and its d i r e ~ t o r s . ~ ~  Section 11 of the Securi- 
ties is designed not so much to compensate the defrauded 
purchaser as to deter negligence and fraud, by imposing liability 
upon corporate directors and other persons participating in the 
illegal distribution of a registered security? Nevertheless, Con- 
gress provided a due diligence defense to section 11 actions, be- 
cause anything less than that would be an imposition of insurer's 
liability, which would "obviously have imposed an unjust and 
insurmountable burden on those who have the responsibility for 
the conduct of the corporate enterprise?' 
Imposition of such an onerous burden is also a likely conse- 
quence of the court's action in the present case. The court stated 
that directors are liable for injury even though they make every 
64. See   lob us v. Law Research Serv. Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 
397 U.S. 913 (1970); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. $4 77a-aa. 
65. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1933). 
66. See Globus v. Law Research Sew. Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969). 
67. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 29, 48 (1959); see 15 U.S.C. § 77k (b), (c). There was a bitter struggle between the 
Senate and the House over the civil liability that should be imposed on the officers and 
directors of the registrant. The Senate wanted to impose insurer's liability but acquiesced 
in the House version which allowed the due diligence defense. Landis, supra; H.R. REP. 
No. 152,73d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1933). See generally Kroll, Some Reflections on Indemni- 
fication Provisions and S.E. C.  Liability Insurance in the Light of BarChris and Globus, 
24 Bus. LAW. 681, 687-88 (1969). 
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reasonable effort to be within the bounds of the law. If the court's 
general language is extended to its logical conclusion, a director 
will be liable not only for racial discrimination but for every other 
tort of the corporation as well. The only possible relief may be an 
indemnification agreement with the corporation, but these are 
increasingly being held to be against public policy? 
2. Effect on the competence of corporate directors 
In describing the conflict between the stockholders' interests 
and director discretion, one author has noted: 
There is a natural inclination to protect a stockholder from the 
infringement upon his interest caused by the acts of the negli- 
gent director. On the other hand it is recognized that the exer- 
cise of the director's discretion reflects the competence, agres- 
siveness, and efficiency of American industry and that to sub- 
ject the director to personal libility for a mistake in judgment 
is to intimidate him and to create a highly conservative business 
climate resulting in failure to exploit opportunities involving 
more than a small degree of risk. Furthermore, [personal] lia- 
bility for errors in judgment would tend to discourage able indi- 
viduals from accepting the position. In this scenario society 
emerges as the loser.6s 
This language suggests two possible consequences of the circuit 
court's decision: 1) directors may be forced to adopt a highly 
conservative attitude,'O and 2) better qualified individuals will 
be less willing to serve as corporate directors.'l The threat of lia- 
bility will inevitably be a significant concern to the competent 
individuals needed to  fill corporate leadership positions. 
3. Effect on attorney-director relationships 
Of additional concern is the possible effect of the instant case 
on attorney-director relationships. If a director cannot be relieved 
68. See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 4 14.04[2]; Bishop, Sitting Ducks and 
Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Oficers, 77 
YALE L.J. 1078 (1968); Comment, supra note 13, at 478. 
69. Comment, supra note 13, at 470. See also Dyson, supra note 13, at 346-47. 
70. See Adkin & Janis, Some Observations on Liabilities of Corporate Directors, 20 
Bus. LAW. 817, 821 (1965) ("Howerever, if a director acts objectively, carefully (but not 
necessarily overcautiously) and diligently, his management of the corporation's affairs 
should be immune from attack."). 
On the other hand, directors could adopt extremely liberal policies, disregarding 
possible personal liabilities since due diligence will not relieve them of liability. Stock- 
holder control makes this possibility unlikely, however. 
71. See PERSONAL LIABILITIES, supra note 12, at 37. 
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of liability for relying on counsel's opinion, should the director be 
indemnified by the attorney who incorrectly interpreted the 
The attorney's function in negotiation and documentation 
of corporate ventures is a vital one,73 since corporate directors and 
presidents may not be trained in the law and cannot reasonably 
be expected to be personally knowledgeable on all legal matters 
touching their business affairs. If, however, corporate directors 
are to be held personally liable, along with the corporation, for 
relying on the advice and substantiated opinions of corporate 
attorneys, that important relationship will certainly be under- 
mined. Attorneys will be more reluctant to give unqualified opin- 
ions and directors will be equally reluctant to rely on opinions 
given. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
If the standard of director liability of the present case is 
narrowly confined to the civil rights context, the decision may 
have minor impact. But narrow application of the standard is by 
no means assured. Unless the scope of the case is limited by 
future decisions, it may be used to impose liability on corporate 
directors whenever the erroneous advice of experts causes a corpo- 
ration to breach a contract or commit a trespass. Such an appli- 
cation of the standard, in a nonracial context, is unwarranted and 
unwise. The holding of the present case should be limited to the 
peculiar context in which it arose. 
72. For a general discussion of the importance of legal opinions in business transac- 
tions, see Fuld, Legal Opinions in Business Transactions-An Attempt to Bring Some 
Order Out of Some Chaos, 28 Bus. LAW. 915 (1973). 
73. See generally Bernant, The Role of the Opinion of Counsel: A Tentative 
Reevaluation, 49 CALIF. S.B.J. 132 (1974). 
